Example of Equal Footing Phobia: Kelley's circular moral realism presumption on the word "endorse".
Actually written JUNE 7, 2023
Here’s an example of equal footing phobia (defined in this paragraph) as expressed by David Kelley.
He starts by stating what I hold is a non-moralist principle:
“… the principle that values are subjective, that values flow from the fact of desire – the fact that people desiring things is what grounds the existence of values.”
This principle I take to be non-moralism.
Now he expresses equal footing phobia in terms of the consequences of assuming that non-moralist principle:
“And if we make that [non-moralist] assumption; then we endorse not only peaceful, innocent, benevolent desires; we also endorse, by the logic of the assumption, the desire for power, for every destructive impulse, the desire for the un-earned, resentment against achievement, and so on.”
(Recorded speech by David Kelley, “Objectivism & the Struggle for Liberty, Laissez Faire Supper Club – Nov. 10, 88”, Liberty Audio & Film Service)
The idea, again, is that if desires exhaust the meaning of values (such that there is no morality), then we endorse both benevolent desires and malevolent desires.
First, I want to point out the non-sequitur aspect of this argument. If non-moralism is true, it does not logically follow that we endorse both benevolent desires and malevolent desires. If non-moralism is true, then endorsement is a matter of desire. It is then possible to desire/endorse only benevolent desires, but not malevolent ones (the way I do, for instance).
The only way to give the argument some apparent validity is to assume that “endorsement” means moral endorsement, i.e. a desire-void kind of endorsement.
But that would just be another way of assuming that non-moralism is wrong (factually wrong, not morally wrong) with no supporting arguments.
I therefore find it reasonable to take the argument offered as standing on it’s own as a refutation of non-moralism. So, as presented, the argument is just non-sequitur circularity.
See this more clearly with this condensed formulation of the non-sequitur:
“If our only basis for endorsement is desire, then we must endorse all desires.” Huh? That makes no sense. I refute you by endorsing only benevolent desires.
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