Jason McQuinn Describes the Pan-Deontic
Actually written JULY 4, 2018
The following quotes from anarchist non-moralist Jason McQuinn give me a sense that “pan-deonticism” is rampant even among folks who would like to think of themselves as rejecting morality, or at least rejecting “oppressive” morality.
The same strategy is usually employed whenever the critique of morality begins to be formulated. Although most dictionary definitions of morality clearly imply it involves the fetishization of values, this implication is lost on most readers. For example, The New Oxford American Dictionary defines morality as “principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.” Obviously, the “right and wrong or good and bad” qualifiers here are most likely to be taken (unself-consciously) as fetishized, transcendental values, rather than as particular, finite choices with no claims to any reality beyond the unique desires of individual human beings. However, the moment the critique of morality is raised, even in Anarchy magazine, there are always those who pop up with the aim to confuse things (in order to defend their own moralistic commitments) by claiming in one form or another that there is no such thing as a non-moral human value! Most people, in common with dictionary definitions, would never say that a person expressing her or his own desires with no claim to transcendental status for them is being moral by valuing a particular goal. But the defenders of morality will come out of the woodwork to claim that even the most finite, ephemeral and contingent human desire indicates the existence of a moral system every bit as real as those taught by the various branches of the Catholic Church!
[Demoralizing Moralism: The Futility of Fetishized Values, Page ?]
One of the most striking aspects of moralistic practice involves the generally futile attempts to communicate across the finite ethics/compulsory morality divide (which will surely be evidenced in moralistic reactions to this essay). Even when those who have no belief in any fetishized value-systems make quite clear that their criticisms and commentary develop from their own practical experiences within particular social contexts and historical situations, their words are almost automatically interpreted instead through a moralistic framework that assumes these criticisms and commentary must be based on some undeclared, but still-transcendent system of values! Moralists most often see only other moralists, even when none are there. And, further, moralists often see — and criticize — these other (phantasmic) moralists as being exceedingly (yet occultly) moralistic, even when absolutely no evidence can be found for such a charge!
No evidence. No evidence? Well ...
I agree with McQuinn on the nature of morality and non-morality, but I want to take a jab at him here for not being careful and consistent enough in his use of language. ‘Cause if you are going to argue against the pan-deontics, it is wise not to use meta-ethically ambiguous words. Such words give them a chance to claim that you are using those words in a moral sense, even if you are not. And they will see that as “evidence”.
So where did McQuinn use a meta-ethically ambiguous word?
He used it in the same essay I’ve been quoting above. I again quote:
“Whatever the specific content of compulsory morality, the effects are basically similar. A person’s ability to think clearly and act decisively in his or her own interests (within appropriate contexts) is compromised or sabotaged.”
“Appropriate” is a meta-ethically ambiguous word. Pan-deontics will use it as evidence that you mean morally appropriate, and subsequently insist you are a moralist like they are.
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